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Abstract
We use a growth model in which saving, fertility and labour market participation are en-
dogenous, to quantify the cost that barriers to female labour force participation impose in terms
of an economy’s output. The model is calibrated to mimic the U.S. economy’s behavior in the
long-run. We find that a 50 percent increase in the gender wage gap leads to a 35 percent
decrease in income per capita in steady-state. Using independent estimates of the female to
male earnings ratio for a wide cross-section of countries, we construct an economy with param-
eters similar to those calibrated for the U.S. economy, except for the degree of gender barriers.
Higher discrimination decreases steady-state output per capita for two distinct reasons: a direct
effect due to the decrease in female labour market participation, and an indirect effect working
through an increase in fertility. For several countries, a large fraction of the difference between
the country’s output and U.S. output can be ascribed to differences in gender discrimination.
In addition, we find that close to half of the overall decrease in output per capita is due to the
effect of gender discrimination in fertility.
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Everywhere females find it more difficulty than males to access market activities, political
power, or health and education inputs.1 Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi (2006) suggest that “no
country in the world has yet reached equality between women and men in critical areas such as
economic participation, education, health, and political empowerment.”2 Gender discrimination
has many guises, probably interrelated in their causes and consequences, as they are part of a
complex system of social, cultural, and economic determinants. The economics literature has
studied the microeconomics of job and wage discrimination in some detail, thus far focusing on the
individual cost of discrimination.3 We believe it is time to estimate the aggregate cost of gender
discrimination, and for that purpose we use a long-run macro model where discrimination affects
investment, fertility, and the steady-state features of the economy
Providing an estimate of the cost of discrimination to aggregate output is important for several
reasons. First, gender inequality remains high in many countries (e.g., Doepke, Tertilt, and Voena,
2012; Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi, 2006). Second, although gender discrimination is largely de-
termined by social and cultural characteristics which hardly change in the short run,4 there are
several gender-related policies which could foster gender equality and therefore reduce discrimina-
tion.5 Finally, to our knowledge, this is the first paper to use a structural model to quantify the
long-run output effects of barriers to female labour force participation. A model-based estimate
is key as it takes into consideration how agents and prices respond to different levels of gender
discrimination. Such a model also captures indirect effects of gender discrimination, including en-
dogenous changes in the fertility rate, while allowing us to run counterfactual experiments that
take into account general equilibrium effects.
From the seminal paper by Galor and Weil (1996), a strand of the literature has examined
1As an example, Alesina, Lotti, and Mistrulli (2013) show that Italian women have to pay higher interest rates than
men, even when exhibiting a better credit history, and after controlling for a host of personal and firm characteristics.
2See also the 2012 World Development Report (cf., World Bank, 2011) on gender equality and development.
3Some authors have argued that the tax rates on second earners (usually the woman) are much higher than those
on the first earner, de facto further discouraging female labour force participation (cf., Bick and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln,
2012). Alesina, Ichino, and Karabarbounis (2011)have suggested going further and imposing differential gender-based
tax rates, especially given the higher tax elasticity of women’s labour supply.
4See Fernandez (2007) and Algan and Cahuc (2007) for the importance of culture and family characteristics on
FLFP. For the role of religion on FLFP, see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003), Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos
(1989), and Siaroff (1994). Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) show that men whose mothers worked while they
were growing up tend to marry working women. See also Acemoglu, Autor, and Lyle (2004).
5For instance, improvement in women’s legal rights, and female empowerment through gender-related education
and training programs. See Doepke, Tertilt, and Voena (2012) for a documentation of how women’s rights vary across
countries.
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gender-related issues within a growth framework.6 An example is Lagerlo¨f (2003) who focuses on the
relationship between gender discrimination and long-run growth. His model of a secular economy
inspired on the European historical experience, relates gender discrimination with the industrial
revolution and the demographic transition.7 Doepke and Tertilt (2009) develop a model to explain
how women’s economic and legal rights are endogenously extended over the process of economic
development.8 We build our model based on this literature but we study a different question, which
is how gender discrimination quantitatively impacts the economy over the development process. In
our model, gender discrimination drives a wedge between women’s labour productivity and female
wages. We calibrate the model economy so that the long-run equilibrium matches key statistics of
the United States economy, including the gender wage gap. We then explore how the equilibrium
properties of the model change with the level of gender discrimination. This counterfactual exercise
provides an estimate of U.S. output per capita and fertility when the gender wage gap is the same
as in, for instance, Egypt. The effect of gender discrimination on the economy depends on two
forces: less discrimination increases market activity by women, which directly increases output per
capita; it also reduces fertility and increases capital accumulation and thus long-run equilibrium
per capita output. We show how, for some countries, a very large fraction of the difference between
the country’s output and U.S. output is explained by differences in gender discrimination. We also
provide an extension of the model in which the wedge between women’s productivity and their
wage decreases with capital accumulation. Our results are robust to this extension.
As to the nature of the exercise, the study most directly related to ours is Hsieh, Hurst, Jones,
and Klenow (2012), who investigate the aggregate productivity gains in the United States, be-
tween 1960 and 2008, which can be attributed to decreases in labour market discrimination toward
African-Americans and women. While their paper focuses on the aggregate costs of labour market
6There is a related literature which studies empirically the effects of gender inequality on human capital accumu-
lation and economic development and economic growth (e.g., Daly, 2007; Dollar and Gatti, 1999; Hausmann, Tyson,
and Zahidi, 2006; Seguino, 2000). Using growth accounting exercises Young (1995) found that the rise in female
labour force participation accounted for between 0.6 and 1.6 percent of annual per capita growth in the four East
Asian tiger economies. Our research is complementary to this literature since we provide a structural estimation
instead of a reduced form estimation.
7See also Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005) who investigate the role of innovation in home appliances
on fertility and female labour force participation.
8See also Hazan and Maoz (2002), who show how social norms regarding women’s labour force participation
change over time. Bertocchi (2011) offers a rationale for the decision to extend the franchise to females, emerging
from within a politico-economic model. The driving force in her analysis is the increase in the return for intellectual
labour relative to physical labour.
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discrimination on occupational allocations in the United States, we take the US economy as our
benchmark and then compute the costs of gender discrimination in the labour market for a cross
section of countries, given endogenous savings and fertility rates.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the model, describes the behaviour of each
agent in the economy, and defines the equilibrium. Section 2 derives some analytical results using a
simplified version of the model, which is useful to provide the intuition behind our quantitative ex-
ercises. Section 3 describes the model calibration and contains simulations designed to evaluate the
effects of gender discrimination on the benchmark economy. It also considers a model extension in
which the wedge between women’s productivity and their wage changes with capital accumulation.
Finally, Section 4 contains concluding remarks.9
1. The Model
In this section we develop a model to study the cost of gender discrimination to output. Our strategy
is to use a simple growth model with endogenous fertility and female labour market participation
to assess the costs of gender discrimination.
1.1. Women and Men
Our economy is made up of men and women who live for three periods. In the first period, as
children, women and men are indistinguishable, do not make any specific decision, and “consume”
a fraction of their parents’ time endowment, our proxy for parental care. In their second period
of life, agents become adult men and women, organized as couples, and differ in their productivity
in raising children. We assume that women are more productive than men in raising children, but
they are equally productive in market activities. Both men and women can use one unit of time,
divided between time at work and time raising children. During this second period of life, couples
decide how many children to have and allocate their time between the labour market and the task
of raising children. In the third period, each couple consumes the life savings.
The novelty relative to macroeconomic models of fertility and labour market participation is
the introduction of gender discrimination. We assume that there are barriers to female labour
9There is also an appendix with some robustness exercises.
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market participation in the form of wage discrimination. If we take wt to be the labour wage rate,
women receive the fraction φ < 1 of this wage rate, so a lower φ represents a more discriminatory
society.10 Therefore, φ corresponds to a wedge faced by women between their labour productivity
and their wage.11 Therefore, it acts as a distortionary tax and therefore generates some type of
inefficiency (misallocation) in the economy. It can be due to direct discrimination (preference-
based discrimination as in Becker (1957)) and restricted job’s opportunity, such as glass ceiling.
We do not explicitly model how gender discrimination maps into different values for φ, a task
conducted in Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004), Doepke and Tertilt (2011), and Rahim and
Tavares (2012), who take gender discrimination in the labour market as endogenous. Discrimination
costs are redistributed back to households in a non-distortionary, lump-sum manner such that, in
our model, the cost that discrimination generates is solely the wedge between women’s wage and
their marginal productivity.12 Giving micro-foundations for φ is clearly an important extension,
but it goes beyond the goal of this paper, which is to measure whether or not barriers to female
labour force participation might have sizeable quantitative effects on output per capita and what
the channels are. A similar approach is taken by Hall and Jones (1999) and Parente and Prescott
(1994), who quantify how differences in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) explain differences in
output per worker in the long run; or by Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)
and Guner, Ventura, and Yi (2008), who quantify the effects of input misallocation on productivity
in different countries.
10A similar approach is used by Hsieh, Hurst, Jones, and Klenow (2012) and Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan
(2003), who argue that the narrowing wage gap alone explains a large part of the recent increase in female labour
force participation in the United States. Lagerlo¨f (2003), instead, sets up a growth model in which gender differences
arise endogenously in equilibrium through a coordination process. Related to this article is the model presented by
Soares and Falca˜o (2008) in which increases in female labour force participation and reductions in the gender wage
gap are the output of reductions in fertility and in mortality rates.
11Here we assume that φ is fixed. In Subsection 3.4 we let φ change with capital accumulation. This is indeed a
more realistic assumption. However, the approach of an exogenous φ simplifies the analysis and the proof of existence
of a balanced growth path equilibrium.
12This is immaterial for the qualitative nature of the results in our model. In addition, our quantitative analysis
will provide conservative measures of the output costs of discrimination.
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1.2. Technology
The production technology uses capital, Kt, and labour, Lt, to produce output, Yt, according to a
constant returns to scale production function. More specifically,
Yt = K
α
t (AtLt)
1−α, (1)
where At = (1 +µ)
t, and α ∈ (0, 1). Parameter µ ≥ 0 corresponds to the rate of technical progress.
Given the technology and input prices, the representative firm chooses inputs so that profits are
maximized.13 Let wt be the wage rate and r
K
t denote the rental rate of capital. The first-order
conditions associated with the representative firm’s problem are:
wt = (1− α)Kαt (AtLt)−αAt, (2)
rKt = αK
α−1
t (AtLt)
1−α. (3)
1.3. Preferences
As suggested above, couples draw utility from consumption in their second and third period of
life, and from the number of children. Let nt be the number of children born at period t,
14 and
ct and dt+1 be the consumption of a couple in their second and third period of life, respectively.
Preferences are represented by
Ut = ln(ct + c¯t) + β ln dt+1 + γ lnnt, β, γ ∈ (0, 1), (4)
where β is the subjective discount factor and γ represents the relative weight of children in the
couple’s utility function. Quantity c¯t corresponds to home produced consumption goods. As in
Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005), c¯t generates a decline in fertility as the economy
develops. See Hazan and Berdugo (2002) for a similar approach. We assume that home production
increases with technical change, such that c¯t = Atc¯, where c¯ > 0.
15
13Output is taken as the numeraire.
14Since the household is organized as a couple, we could interpret nt as the number of couples generated by each
household.
15Therefore, there is technical change in home production, as suggested by Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008) and
Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005). In addition, this generates a long-run balanced growth path equilibrium
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Let hwt and h
h
t denote the time of the wife and the husband spent in raising children. In the
spirit of Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005), we assume that children consume time
resources according to the equation
nt = D(h
w
t + ηh
h
t )
θ, D > 0, θ ∈ (0, 1). (5)
Parameter D > 0 and θ > 0 determine the level and curvature, respectively, of the production
function to raise children. We assume that η ∈ (0, 1), which implies that women are more productive
than men in raising children, as emphasized by Albanesi and Olivetti (2009) in relation to women’s
ability to breastfeed.16
1.4. Budget Constraints
The couple’s budget constraints are:
ct + st ≤ wt(1− hht ) + φwt(1− hwt ) +$t, (6)
dt+1 ≤ (1 + rt+1)st, (7)
where st represents investment and the right-hand side shows net income of the couple. Variable
$t stands for transfers to households. We assume that discrimination costs are redistributed lump-
sum back to households. This implies that the cost of discrimination we calculate is due only to a
wedge between women’s marginal productivity of labor and their wage. In other words, the effect
is due to misallocation and distortionary discrimination, not to any waste of resources.
Couples choose the level of consumption when young, ct, and when old, dt+1, the number of
children nt, the fraction of time allocated to household chores h
w
t and h
h
t , and savings, st, all this so
as to maximize (4) subject to (5), (6), and (7). It can be shown that when hwt < 1 then h
h
t = 0,
17
and
hwt =
γθ
(1 + β + γθ)
[
1 + φ
φ
+
c¯t
φwt
+
$t
φwt
], (8)
in which per worker capital and output grow at the rate of technical change.
16In Appendix 5 we present a model based on Galor and Weil (1996) in which there are two types of labour, mental
and physical labour, and for each unit of time men have a higher endowment of physical labour than women but an
equal endowment of mental labour. Quantitative results are similar using both approaches.
17Observe that, for hwt < 1 and h
h
t > 0 we would need η ≥ 1/φ, which cannot ever be the case since φ < 1 and
η < 1.
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which is increasing in gender inequality (lower φ). When hwt < 1 then h
h
t = 0, then consumption
and investment are:
ct =
1
1 + β + γθ
[(1 + φ)wt − (γθ + β)c¯t + ωt], (9)
st =
β
1 + β + γθ
[(1 + φ)wt + c¯t + ωt], (10)
dt+1 = (1 + rt+1)st. (11)
But it can be the case that hwt = 1 and h
h
t ∈ (0, 1). Then, we have that
hht =
γθ
(1 + β + γθ)
[
1 + η
η
+
c¯t
wt
+
$t
wt
]− 1
η
. (12)
If η is sufficiently small (η → 0), then hht = 0 for any finite wage. We make this assumption here
and investigate the model in which hht = 0 and h
w
t ∈ (0, 1].
1.5. Equilibrium
Let Pt denote the number of adult households in period t. In equilibrium, demand equals supply in
all markets. In the labour market this means that Lt = Pt(2− hwt ). Let kˆt be the capital level per
unit of efficiency couple, i.e., kˆt =
Kt
AtPt
. We also have $t = (1−φ)(1−hwt )wt, which corresponds to
the resources firms lose because they discriminate. Transfers are equal to the cost of discrimination.
Then, using equation (2) into (8), yields
hwt = min{1,
γθ
(1 + β)φ+ γθ
[2 +
c¯
(1− α)kˆαt (2− hwt )−α
]}, (13)
From the expression above, a necessary condition for women to participate in the labour market is
that
Assumption 1 : 2γθ(1+β)φ+γθ ≤ 1 ⇒ φ ≥ γθ1+β .
Assumption 1 implies a limit for the size of gender discrimination in the labour market. We
have that
nt = D[min{1, γθ
(1 + β)φ+ γθ
[2 +
c¯
(1− α)kˆαt (2− hwt )−α
]}]θ, (14)
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and the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1. Let Assumption 1 be satisfied so that women participate in the labour market.
Then we have:
(i) Female hours of work in the market increase with capital accumulation, kˆt, and decrease with
labour market discrimination (low φ);
(ii) Fertility decreases with capital accumulation, kˆt, and increases with labour market discrimi-
nation (low φ).
Proof. Equation (13) determines hwt as an implicit function of kˆt, ψ(kˆt, φ), and a critical value kˆ
∗(φ)
such that
hwt =
 1 for kˆt ≤ kˆ
∗(φ),
ψ(kˆt, φ) for kˆt ≥ kˆ∗(φ),
(15)
and ψ(kˆt, φ) ∈ (0, 1] ∀ kˆt ≥ kˆ∗(φ), where:
kˆ∗(φ) = [
c¯γθ
(1− α)(φ(1 + β)− γθ) ]
1
α . (16)
Using the implicit function theorem we can show that ψ1(kˆt, φ) < 0 and ψ2(kˆt, φ) < 0, as long as
kˆt ≥ kˆ∗(φ). The second part of the proof is trivial since nt = D(hwt )θ and D > 0 and θ > 0.
Proposition 1 implies that time devoted to home activities decreases with capital accumulation.
Observe that when barriers to female labour force participation are high (φ is low), women work
fewer hours in the market. Since fertility is an increasing function of hours at home, the number of
children decreases with capital accumulation and increases with gender discrimination in the form
of barriers to female labour force participation.
In equilibrium we have that savings are given by:
st =

β
1+β [wt + c¯t] for h
w
t = 1,
φβ
(1+β)φ+γθ [2wt + c¯t] for h
w
t < 1.
(17)
The condition that equilibrates the capital market is
Kt+1 = Ptst. (18)
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Since Pt+1 = ntPt, we have that capital per effective unit of workers is
kˆt+1 =
st
(1 + µ)Atnt
. (19)
Using equations (14) and (17) into (19), we have that:
kˆt+1 =

β[(1−α)kˆαt +c¯]
D(1+β)(1+µ)
for kˆt ≤ kˆ∗,
∆(φ)[(1− α)kˆαt (2− hwt )−α]θ[c¯ + 2(1− α)kˆαt (2− hwt )−α]1−θ for kˆt ≥ kˆ∗,
(20)
where ∆(φ) = φβ
D(1+µ)[(1+β)φ+γθ]1−θ(γθ)θ is a positive constant. Using (15) into (20) defines a non-
linear difference equation kˆt+1 = ξ(kˆt).
Proposition 2. Let Assumption 1 be satisfied. Then:
(i) If c¯ = 0, then there exists a unique globally stable steady-state equilibrium for capital per
effective unit of labour, kˆt+1 = kˆt = kˆ
ss, such that female hours of work in the market are
constant;
(ii) If c¯ is sufficiently small, then there exists at least one locally stable steady-state equilibrium
for capital per effective unit of labour, kˆt+1 = kˆt = kˆ
ss, such that in the neighbourhood of kˆss
female hours of work in the market increase with capital accumulation.
Proof. When c¯ = 0, then
hwt = h
w(φ) =
2γθ
(1 + β)φ+ γθ
,
which is less than one by assumption 1. In this case, we have that
kˆt+1 = 2
1−θ∆(φ)(1− α)kˆαt (
2(1 + β)φ
(1 + β)φ+ γθ
)−α.
Therefore, we can easily show that the difference equation kˆt+1 = ξ(kˆt) is strictly concave in kˆt and
limkˆt→0 ξ
′(kˆt) =∞ and limkˆt→∞ ξ′(kˆt) = 0. This implies that there exists a unique globally stable
steady-state equilibrium for kˆ. When c¯ > 0, then the difference equation kˆt+1 = ξ(kˆt) is represented
by (20). There are several possible cases. However, when c¯ is sufficiently small such that kˆ∗(φ)
is smaller than the capital stock per effective unit of labour in which the capital accumulation
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equation for hwt = 1
kˆt+1 =
β[(1− α)kˆαt + c¯]
D(1 + β)(1 + µ)
crosses the 45 degree line, then we can ensure that the difference equation kˆt+1 = ξ(kˆt) has at least
one locally steady-state equilibrium, kˆt+1 = kˆt = kˆ
ss, such that in the neighbourhood of kˆss female
hours of work in the market increase with capital accumulation. This follows from the fact that
kˆt+1 = ξ(kˆ
∗(φ)) > kˆ∗(φ) and we can show that limkt→∞ ξ′(kˆt) = 0, which completes the proof since
ξ(kˆt) is a continuous function of kˆt.
When c¯ = 0 preferences are homothetic and the substitution effect implies that fertility should
decrease with capital accumulation and the wage rate, while the income effect implies that fertility
increases with capital accumulation and the wage rate. The log-utility implies that the substitution
and income effects exactly cancel each other out, such that fertility and therefore female hours
of work in the market are constant and do not vary with capital accumulation. When c¯ > 0,
then preferences are not homothetic and households spend a larger fraction of their income on
consumption in the first period of life as their labour income rises so that capital accumulation
leads to a decrease in fertility.
2. Gender Barriers and Development: Analytical Results
In this section we derive some analytical results. For the model with c¯ = 0 we can analytically find
the steady-state equilibrium of the capital stock per effective worker.
kˆss(φ) =

(
β(1−α)
D(1+β)(1+µ)
) 1
1−α
, if φ ≤ γθ1+β ,
φ
((1+β)φ+γθ)
1−θ−α
1−α
[
21−θ−αβ(1−α)(1+β)−α
D(1+µ)(γθ)θ
] 1
1−α
, if φ > γθ1+β .
(21)
For any φ > γθ1+β , it is straightforward to see that an increase in gender discrimination, i.e. a
lower φ, implies a decrease in the long-run capital stock per effective worker. Moreover, output per
effective unit of labour is given by
yˆss(φ) =

(
β(1−α)
D(1+β)(1+µ)
) α
1−α
, if φ ≤ γθ1+β ,
φ(2(1+β))1−α
((1+β)φ+γθ)
1−α(1+θ)
1−α
[
21−θ−αβ(1−α)(1+β)−α
D(1+µ)(γθ)θ
] α
1−α
, if φ > γθ1+β .
(22)
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When φ > γθ1+β output per effective unit of labour is decreasing with gender discrimination in the
labour market. If φ ≤ γθ1+β , then women will not participate in the labour market and discrimination
will not have any effect on output.
Proposition 3. Let Assumption 1 be satisfied such that φ > γθ1+β and c¯ = 0. Consider two
economies (economy A and economy B) in which the only difference between these two economies
is the level of gender barriers to female labour force participation. Then:
(i) the ratio of output per effective worker of the two economies is given by:
yˆss(φA)
yˆss(φB)
=
φA
φB
((1 + β)φB + γθ)
1−α(1+θ)
1−α
((1 + β)φA + γθ)
1−α(1+θ)
1−α
. (23)
(ii) Moreover, in the limiting case in which α(1 + θ)→ 1 (e.g., α→ 12 and θ → 1), then the ratio
of output per worker of the two economies is given by the ratio in the level of gender barriers
to female labour force participation, i.e.,
lim
α(1+θ)→1
yˆss(φA)
yˆss(φB)
=
φA
φB
. (24)
Proof. This follows directly from equation (22).
In the particular case of the second item of Proposition 3, differences in output per worker
amongst similar economies will be proportional to differences in gender barriers to female labour
force participation as long as φ > γθ1+β .
18 Since in this model gender barriers are reflected in
the gender wage gap, we could map differences in output per effective worker with reference to
differences in the gender wage gap. For instance, if we consider a counterfactual economy similar to
the United States but with the gender wage gap of Egypt, then output per effective worker in the
hypothetical economy would be 37 percent of the one in the United States, as long as φ > γθ1+β .
19
18There is a limit of how gender discrimination in the labour market affects output per effective labour, since
yˆss(φ) ≥
(
β(1−α)
D(1+β)(1+µ)
) α
1−α
.
19Otherwise, the output per effective worker of this counterfactual economy will be higher than 37 percent of the
United States economy.
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Output per capita is given by
yt =
Yt
ntPt + Pt +
Pt
nt−1
=
Yt
Pt
1
(nt + 1 +
1
nt−1 )
= Atyˆt
1
(nt + 1 +
1
nt−1 )
.
In the long run, the ratio in per capita output for economies A and B in the case in which c¯ = 0,
φ > γθ1+β , and α(1 + θ)→ 1 would be given by
ysst (φ
A)
ysst (φ
B)
=
φA
φB
(n(φB) + 1 + 1
n(φB)
)
(n(φA) + 1 + 1
n(φA)
)
. (25)
When population is still growing over time, i.e., n(φi) > 1, for i ∈ {A,B}, then the difference
in output per capita between economies A and B will be larger than the difference in output per
effective worker of these two economies.20The reason is that since fertility is higher when gender
barriers to female labour force participation are higher, then the total dependency ratio, the ratio
of those out of the labour force (children and old adults) to those in the labour force, is larger for
economies with smaller φ.
What are the effects of gender discrimination in the labour market on long-run welfare? On the
one hand, gender discrimination decreases capital accumulation and therefore output, consumption,
and consequently welfare. On the other hand, it increases fertility, which has a positive effect on
the utility of households. The utility costs of gender wage gaps might therefore be lower than the
output costs. For the case in which c¯ = 0 and φ > γθ1+β , it can be shown that in the long run the
indirect utility of the representative household is given by
V (φ) = (1 + β)
[
ln(φ)−
(
(1− α(1 + θ))
1− α + θ(γ + β)
)
]
]
ln[(1 + β)φ+ γθ] + ϑt, (26)
where ϑt is a term which depends on the time trend t and all constants except φ. We can see that
when the gender wage gap increases (φ decreases), then there are two effects on welfare: (i) the first
term on the right-hand side of (26) implies that welfare decreases; while the second term on the
right-hand side of (26) suggests that welfare increases. Taking the derivative of V (φ) with respect
20Quantity (n(φ) + 1 + 1
n(φ)
) is negative related to φ when n(φ) < 1.
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to φ implies that:
V ′(φ) = (1 + β)2θ
[γ(1−φ)1+β + φ(
α
1−α − β1+β )]
φ[(1 + β)φ+ γθ]
. (27)
This derivative is positive if and only if the following condition holds:
γ(1− φ)
φ
+
α(1 + β)
1− α > β. (28)
Observe that a sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is that α(1+β)1−α > β and this is satisfied
for the common estimate of capital share of income (α = 13), as documented by Gollin (2002).
21 In
addition, we expect condition (28) to hold for small values of φ. Therefore, a decrease in gender
barrier to female labour force participation (an increase in φ) should, in general, increase welfare
in discriminatory societies.
It is important to highlight that the analytical results were derived for a particular model in
which fertility and female hours worked in the labour market are constant over time. Results were
also derived for the long-run balanced growth path equilibrium and transitional dynamics were not
considered. In order to solve for the transitional dynamics and to quantify the effects of gender
barriers to female labour market participation in a more general framework in which fertility is not
necessarily constant, we need to solve the model numerically. This is what we do next.
3. Gender Barriers and Development: Numerical Results
In this section we quantify the cost of gender discrimination on output per capita. Our strategy is
to choose parameter values consistent with empirical observations in the United States and then
perform counter-factual analysis by investigating the effects of gender barriers to female labour
force participation on output per capita and other statistics.
3.1. Measurement: Replicating a Baseline Economy
Table 1, Part I, provides all parameter values as well as a note on how each parameter was obtained.
Below, we describe our calibration in detail. The model period in our economy is taken to be
25 years. Therefore, each agent lives for 75 years. We start the model period in 1900 and the
21If α = 1
3
, then condition (28) implies that β < 1, which is true by assumption.
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corresponding final year of analysis is after four periods, or in 2000.22 The capital share α is set to
0.40, which is consistent with Gollin (2002). We set the value of µ such that total factor productivity
(TFP) growth in the United States is equal to 1.5 percent per year, which is consistent with the
TFP growth rate in the U.S. in the second half of the 20th Century (e.g., Greenwood, Seshadri,
and Vandenbroucke, 2005).23 We set the discount factor β such that the real rate of return of a
risk free bond is roughly 2.2 percent, which is the average historical real rate of return on T-Bills
from 1975 to 2000.24 The altruism factor, γ, is calibrated so that the population is constant in
the long-run equilibrium.25 In the model, the fertility rate is 2.02 in 2000, which is close to the
observed United States level - fertility rate adjusted for survival to age 10 in the United States is
roughly 2 in 2000.26 We set the values of the remaining five parameters - kˆ0, c¯, φ, D, and θ - so
that we approach five empirical observations for the U.S. economy:
i. The ratio of per capita income in 2000 relative to its level in 1900.27
ii. The fertility rate adjusted for survival to age 10 in 1900.28
iii. The female to male earnings in 2000;29
iv. The ratio of female to male hours of work in 2000;30
22After four periods the capital stock per unit of efficiency couple will be 95 percent of its steady-state level.
23According to Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005), the annual growth rate of total factor productivity
(TFP) in the United States was 1.41 percent between 1900 and 1948 and jumped to about 1.68 percent between 1948
and 1974. After 1974 there was a productivity slowdown as the TFP growth rate decreased by about 0.57 percent.
From 1995 to 2000 the TFP growth rate increased to about 1.2 percent per year. We normalize the initial TFP value
to A0 = 1.
24This is the T-Bills 12 months nominal interest rate minus the consumer price index. For the T-Bills we use the
H15 table from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the inflation of the consumer price index
we took from the international finance statistics of the IMF.
25In the model, a household means a couple and their children. Therefore, n = 1 implies a fertility rate of 2 in the
data.
26See Goss (2010).
27According to Maddison (2006), the 2000 real per capita income in the United States was about 7 times higher
than its level in 1900.
28According to Goss (2010) the fertility rate in 1900 adjusted by survival to age 10 was about 2.6. In our calibration,
c¯ = 0.4, which is a number close to the number used by Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005) in a similar
environment.
29Data from the United Nations (2005) show that the female to male earnings ratio is equal to 63 percent in the
United States. This dataset uses National Accounts information and estimates the female to male earnings ratio using
the non-agricultural wage, the female and male participation rates, and the female and male total populations. Using
the Panel Study Income Dynamics (PSID) Olivetti and Petrangolo (2008) show that the gender wage gap is about
67.5 percent. We will make cross-country comparisons and the United Nations (2005) provide estimate of the female
to male earnings ratio for a large sample of countries, including developing countries. Therefore, for comparison
reasons we let the female to male earnings ratio to be equal to 63 percent in the baseline economy.
30According to Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2005), women worked 40 percent fewer hours than men. Men worked
on average 37.6 hours per week while women worked 26.7 hours per week. About half of this difference in hours of
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Table 1: Parameter values, basic statistics, baseline economy
Part I: Parameter Values
Parameters Values Comment/Observations
α 0.4 Capital share based on Gollin (2002)
µ 0.4509 Rate of TFP growth based on
Greenwood et al (2005)
β 0.3747 Calibrated to match the T-Bill annual
real rate of return, 2.2%
γ 0.1220 Constant population level
along the steady-state
D 2.184 Calibrated to match the average
private cost of children/GDP
θ 0.965 Calibrated to match hours worked
by women relative to hours worked
by men in 2000
φ 0.63 Calibrated to match the U.S. female
to male earnings ratio in 2000
c¯ 0.4 Calibrated to match the U.S. fertility rate
adjusted for survival in 1900, Goss (2010)
kˆ0 0.0505 Calibrated to match the U.S.
yUS2000/y
US
1900, (Maddison (2006))
Part II: Basic Statistics
U.S. economy Baseline economy
φ 63% 63%
y2000/y1900 7.0 7.0
1− hw2000/1− hh2000 60% 55%
φw2000h
w
2000/y2000 40% 33%
Real interest rate, 1975-2000 2.2% 2.4%
Fertility rate, 1900 2.6 2.43
v. the average private cost of children (ie., the opportunity cost of staying at home) as a share
of GDP per capita.31
Observe that the calibrated model matches most of the target values (see Table 1, Part II),
except the ratio of female to male hours of work in 2000 and the private cost of children as a share
of the GDP per capita.32 Our model implies that women spend about 18 percent less hours in home
activities in 2000 than in 1900. Estimates from Ramey and Francis (2009) suggest that the number
work is accounted for by the gender difference in hours per worker (intensive margin) while the remaining part is
accounted for by the gender difference in participation (extensive margin). We target the overall difference in hours
worked since there is no extensive margin decision in our model.
31According to Haveman and Wolfe (1995) this ratio is equal to 40 percent in the United States. See also Doepke,
Hazan, and Maoz (2007).
32The difference between the data value and the model value were 8 percent and 17.5 percent for the ratio of female
to male hours of work in 2000 and the private cost of children as a share of the GDP per capita, respectively. We
define G(Ω) as the vector containing the absolute percent deviation between model moments and data moments at
a vector of parameters Ω = (kˆ0, c¯, θ,D, β). We chose Ωˆ to minimise the mean of G(Ω). In our calibration the mean
of G(Ωˆ) is less than 5 percent. The median is less than 1 percent.
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of hours per woman in home production decreased by 40 percent from 1900 to 2000.33 Our model
thus underestimates the reduction in the number of hours spent by women in home activities over
the development process. However, we highlight that in our model the driving force in the reduction
of time spent in home activities is capital accumulation. As argued by Greenwood, Seshadri, and
Yorukoglu (2005), there are other factors, such as technical progress in the home sector, that are
important in accounting for the reduction in hours of housework.34 Following Greenwood, Seshadri,
and Vandenbroucke (2005), we could have increased parameter D in 1950 to mimic the technical
progress that occurred in the home sector. This, however, would not have added any new insight
to our analysis. In our model the capital-to-output ratio in 2000 is 5.77, which is higher than the
one observed in the United States economy, which is roughly 3.5 (e.g., Chen, I˙mrohorog˘lu, and
I˙mrohorog˘lu, 2009). However, in our model we do not consider intangible capital. McGrattan and
Prescott (2011) show that if one considers investment in R&D and innovation as intangible capital,
then the average capital-to-output ratio in the United States is 5.77.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the baseline economy, represented by the solid line. Figure 1(a)
describes the evolution of the capital stock, with kˆt+1 on the y axis and kˆt on the x axis, and the
steady-state is found where this line is crossed by the 45 degree line. Simulations with the baseline
parameter values show that there is a unique steady-state equilibrium for kˆt > 0.
35 Figure 1(b)
shows the mechanics of the increase in women’s hours worked: as capital is accumulated, then
the opportunity cost of staying at home decreases fertility, and increases female labour market
participation. The dotted black line in both graphs describes an economy with a female-to-male
earnings ratio in 2000 of 56.7 percent instead of 63 percent, as in the baseline economy. Observe
that, in this case, the capital per unit of efficiency couple is lower and women work fewer hours in
the market. In the following section we exploit these “cross-section” changes further.
33According to Ramey and Francis (2009), women spent on average about 50 hours per week in home activities in
1900, compared with about 30 hours per week in 2000.
34In fact, Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008) show that a decrease in the relative price of home appliances has a first-
order effect in female labour force participation. In the current paper we abstract from technical progress in the home
sector, so we underestimate the reduction of hours in home production. Finally, Cavalcanti and Tavares (2011) show
that the process of development is accompanied in virtually all countries by two changes in economic structure: the
increase in the share of government spending in GDP, and the increase in female labour force participation. They
find evidence that these two changes are causally related.
35We consider a fine grid for the capital stock, Kˆ = [0 < kˆ1 < ... < kˆn], such that kˆn = 100 × kˆ, in which kˆ is
the steady-state value for the capital stock. In this grid we show that there is a unique-steady-state equilibrium for
kˆ > 0.
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Figure 1: Baseline economy.
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(b) Hours worked versus capital per unit of efficiency
couple.
Notes: Black solid line: Baseline economy; dotted black line: economy with 10 percent more gender inequality.
3.2. Measurement: The Output Cost of Gender Discrimination
We now explore how the equilibrium properties of the model calibrated in the previous section
change with gender discrimination, measured by the female to male earnings ratio. We vary pa-
rameter φ and examine the model’s predictions along three dimensions: output per capita as a
fraction of U.S. output per capita; female to male earnings ratio; and women’s hours worked in the
market. All statistics correspond to what would be observed in 2000.
Table 2 shows that as gender discrimination in labour market activities increases, the level of
per capita output decreases, and hours spent by women in home activities increase. The effect of φ
on output per capita is sizeable: a decrease in φ by a factor of two decreases output per capita by
approximately 50 percent,36 while hours at home increases by approximately 98 percent.37 Welfare
changes in the same direction of output, however, the welfare effects of gender barriers are smaller.
Welfare effects are measured by the decrease/increase in permanent consumption such that the
utility of the representative household in the baseline economy is similar to the economy with
different gender barriers.38 A decrease in φ by a factor of two decreases welfare by roughly 10
36Output per worker decreases by 42 percent.
371− ht can be interpreted as the fraction of the female population that participates in labour market activities in
a homogeneous couple setup.
38Let the welfare measure be denoted by ϕ, then we have that ϕ =
(
(cb,t+c¯t)
(ca,t+c¯t)
(
db,t+1
da,t+1
)β(
nb,t
na,t
)γ
) 1
1+β
, where subscript
‘b’ denotes the baseline economy and ‘a’ the economy with a different level of gender barriers (φ). The welfare reported
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Table 2: Gender inequality and development: Quantitative properties of the model
Output per Female to Hours at Welfare Output per
capita, male home, % of capita,
% baseline earnings % baseline consumption % baseline
ratio (constant fertility)
U.S. (baseline) 100 63 100 0 100
φ = 1
1.5
× φbase 69 42 152 -5.64 85
φ = 1
2
× φbase 50 32 198 -9.87 72
φ = 1
3
× φbase 42 21 222 -13.67 51
percent. This is a large effect on welfare but substantially smaller than the output costs.
As barriers to female labour market participation increase (that is, φ decreases), there are
two channels through which per capita output decreases.39 First, output per capita decreases
because women work fewer hours in the market (ht decreases), and so output decreases for the
same population. Second, output per capita also decreases because discrimination discourages
women to work more hours in the market and decreases the couple’s total income, leading couples
to choose to have more children, that is, increase nt.
40 What is the relative quantitative importance
of the two effects in the overall impact of discrimination?
In the last column of Table 2 we present results for output per capita in the baseline economy
when fertility is kept constant. We have solved a standard overlapping generations economy without
fertility in which we feed exogenous values of ht into the model as observed in each previous
experiment. In this case, we are isolating the first channel through which gender discrimination
affects output per capita, that is, the effect working solely through number of hours worked by
women.41 When the female to male earnings ratio decreases by a factor of two, output per capita,
in the constant fertility case, decreases by 28 percentage points, compared to 50 percentage points
in the first column. The effect of discrimination through women’s hours at work accounts for about
46 percent of the total reduction in output observed in the model with endogenous fertility.
is the one of an economy with a different φ at 2000. When φ is reduced welfare is also reduced during the transition
and along the balanced growth path equilibrium.
39Per capita output in this model is given by: yt =
Yt
ntL
p
t+L
p
t+
L
p
t
nt−1
. The first term in the denominator corresponds
to the number of existing children, the second term is the number of young couples, and the third term is the number
of elderly couples.
40In our model, as discrimination limits utility gains through female participation and higher consumption, couples
opt for increases in utility through fertility. This effect also accounts, in a larger model, for the lower opportunity
cost of time spent at home, which is reflected in the decision to have more children.
41We can infer the role of fertility in the output decrease as the difference between the first and the last column.
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There is a limit on how gender barriers to female labour force participation can affect aggregate
output and welfare. As φ decreases, then hwt increases until h
w
t = 1. Further decreases in φ would
not change the amount of hours devoted to household chores once hwt = 1.
42 The last row of Table
2 provides the case in which gender barriers are large and women do not participate in the labour
market. Output would decrease by a 2.38 factor.
3.3. Measurement: Counterfactual Analysis
The exercises in the previous section describe the quantitative properties of the model for system-
atic variations in gender discrimination through wage inequality. We now feed the model with
independent estimates of the female to male earnings ratio for several economies, keeping the other
parameters exactly as in the baseline U.S. economy. The purpose of this counterfactual exercise
is to assess how much the level of U.S. output per capita would decrease if gender discrimination
were the same as in, say, Egypt. This will provide us with a first-ever macroeconomic estimate
of how much of the existing difference in output per capita between Egypt and the United States
can be accounted for by differences in gender inequality in pay. In effect, we conduct this exercise
for a large sample of countries. For each country, we feed in an independent estimate of gender
wage inequality and compare the model’s predictions with the relevant country data. We keep all
parameters at their baseline values, except parameter φ, which we adjust until the female to male
earnings ratio is similar to what is observed in the data.43 Table 3 reports results for selected
economies.
We find that when fertility is endogenous, gender wage discrimination explains a large fraction
of the difference in output per capita between some countries (see Table 3, Part I) and the United
States. In the case of Saudi Arabia, barriers to female labour force participation explain almost
the entire gap in relative output per capita. On the other hand, for Ireland the model over predicts
the output gap between Ireland and the United States. Notice that, were the United States to have
the level of gender pay inequality observed in Egypt, output per capita would be 42 percent of its
42Similar results will hold also when η is not sufficiently small and hht ∈ (0, 1).
43In Appendix 6 we discuss three issues related to this approach: First, we consider an alternative measure of the
gender wage gap, which is based on the “unexplained” gender wage gap. We show that for the sample of countries
in which we have measures of the “unexplained” gender wage gap, results are similar using both measures. Second,
we discuss how selection bias in female labour force participation could change our quantitative results. Finally, we
consider issues related to the fact that countries might be in different stages of growth.
20
Table 3: Empirical data and model predictions for reference economies. Source: United Nations (2005)
Countries Data Model
Output Female to Output Female to Output
per capita, male per capita, male per capita,
% of earnings % of earnings % of
baseline ratio baseline ratio baseline
(const fert)
U.S. (baseline) 100 63 100 63 100
Part I
Ireland 91 53 87 53 94
Greece 56 55 90 55 96
Singapore 71 51 84 51 93
Saudi Arabia 37 16 42 16 65
Iran 19 39 64 39 82
Egypt 10 23 42 23 65
India 8 31 49 31 71
Part II
Finland 77 71 109 71 103
Norway 99 77 114 77 105
Sweden 77 81 117 81 107
actual level. Since output per capita in Egypt is 10 percent of that of the United States, gender
discrimination explains about 64 percent of the difference in output per capita between the two
countries. When fertility is constant the model explains about 39 of the difference, still a sizeable
fraction.44
Part II, shows what output per capita in the United States would be if gender barriers were
similar to what is observed in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Scandinavian countries are particularly
interesting because gender inequality in earnings is lower in these countries than in the United
States (see Table 3, part II), but output per capita is slightly lower than in the United States.
Our computations show that the United States can increase output per capita significantly if
gender inequality decreased to the level observed in Scandinavian countries. For instance, if gender
inequality in the US were similar to the one in Sweden, output per capita would be 17 percent
higher than the level observed in 2000.45
44Instead of using the female to male earnings ratio to estimate φ, we could have used the gender gap index (see
Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi (2006)), which is the synthesis of gender discrimination indices in health, education,
and political and economic empowerment. To determine the parameter estimate for φ for each country we could
have multiplied the ratio of the gender gap index of a country to the U.S. value by the baseline φ = 0.63. This is
presented in Appendix 7. Notice that in this case, the experiments underestimate the gender wage gap and gender
barriers explain a smaller fraction of international income differences (see Table 8 in Appendix 7). However, these
experiments would require that the mapping of differences in the gender gap index would translate in the observed
differences in φ.
45Welfare would be 3.73 percent higher relative to the baseline.
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Figure 2: Empirical data and model predictions
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(b) Countries with income per capita greater than 10%
of the U.S. level
Notes: Black squares represent model predictions with endogenous fertility and the black solid line is the best linear
fit. Gray circles and the accompanying gray solid line correspond to the constant fertility model. Dotted gray line:
45 degree line.
Figure 2(a) summarizes the performance of our model for 118 countries, first for the baseline
model and then for the model with constant fertility. The figure plots on the y axis the value of
country output per capita relative to the U.S. level, as predicted by the model. On the x axis, we
plot the value of the exact same variable, as observed in the data. If gender discrimination explained
all of the difference in per capita output between a country and the U.S., the corresponding point
would lie on the 45 degree line. The graphs reveal three extremely important features. First,
the model tends to predict values of per capita output that are higher than those observed in the
data. This is expected given that we focus only on barriers to female labour force participation
and abstract from all other differences amongst countries, such as TFP differences, labour market
institutions, and government policies. We also abstract from the effects of gender discrimination on
human capital, working through a decrease in young girls’access to education, which is also expected
to be considerable. Second, for some countries, gender discrimination explains all of the difference
in relative output levels, as shown by the cases where the point lies very close to the 45 degree
line. Third, the model with endogenous fertility shows a stronger positive correlation between
predicted and actual values, when compared to the exogenous fertility model. The differences
between these two correlations are statistically different from zero at the usual confidence levels.
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Therefore, abstracting from fertility choice and considering only differences in female labour force
participation might lead to misleading conclusions about the effects of barriers for women to work
on development.
A final feature to notice is that for very poor countries gender barriers explain a low fraction of
the difference in income level between these countries and the United States. Very poor countries
have a low level of gender inequality in earnings. In fact, Goldin (1995) and Galor and Weil (1996)
emphasize that female labour force participation has a U-shaped pattern. This is because female
labour force participation is high and gender inequality is low in the traditional agriculture sector.
Therefore, as in Galor and Weil (1996), our model is more appropriated to analyse economies that
are consistent with the modern growth regime with a negative relationship between income and
population growth (e.g., Galor and Weil (2000)). Figure 2(b) shows that the model has a better fit
when we exclude from our simulations countries with output per capita that is below 10 percent of
the U.S. level. The correlation between model predictions and data is almost three times larger than
when the whole sample is included. The difference in correlations between data and model, with
and without endogenous fertility, is also statistically different from zero at any usual confidence
level.
3.4. Causality in gender barriers
In our model, the gender wage gap derives from the existence of barriers to female participation
in the labour market and is constant over time. Although there is empirical evidence showing
that gender inequality is largely determined by social and cultural norms at the national level that
hardly change in the short run,46 this does not imply that economic forces, including structural
transformation, which raises women’s relative wage, do not have an impact on those norms.47
In this section, we alter our benchmark model and let capital accumulation affect the extent of
barriers to female labour force participation. This is an important modification and is in fact
more consistent with the empirical evidence than the model in which gender barriers are constant
over time. The benchmark model is, however, simpler to present and its analytical results are
46See, for instance, Fernandez (2007).
47Hazan and Maoz (2002) provide an interesting model of the dynamics of female labour force participation based
on endogenous changes of social norms. Doepke and Tertilt (2009) show how technical progress can lead men to
choose the extension of women’s rights.
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more straightforwardly derived. Nevertheless, it is important to investigate whether or not the
quantitative results presented in the previous section hold also in this framework with endogenous
gender barriers. We view the results of this Subsection not as a robustness check of the model with
exogenous gender barriers, but as the main quantitative analysis of the paper. We assume that
φt = φ(kˆt) with φ
′(·) > 0 so that gender barriers decrease as the economy develops. In particular,
we let
φt = φ(kˆt) =
 φ1 × (1 + kˆt), φ1 > 0 if kˆt ≤
1
φ1
− 1,
1 if kˆt ≥ 1φ1 − 1.
(29)
The rest of the framework is kept identical to that presented in Section 1. We calibrate the model
to match the same statistics reported in Table 1.48 In this case, the gender wage gap decreases
as the economy accumulates capital and develops, for two reasons: differences in productivity
across genders decrease, and gender discrimination decreases in response to the higher relative
wage of women. Figure 3(a) shows that qualitatively the two economies - with φ exogenous and
φ endogenous - behave similarly in terms of capital per effective unit of couple. The speed of
convergence is faster when φ is exogenous than when φ depends on the capital stock.49 Notice that
the fall in hours worked at home is stronger with φ endogenous than when φ is exogenous. This is
because not only the opportunity cost of staying at home increases with capital accumulation but
also gender barriers decrease.
Table 4 provides some quantitative implications with the model presenting feedbacks from
development to gender barriers (see Table 4). We vary the exogenous parameter φ1 and examine
the model’s predictions along the same dimensions described in Table 2. Again, all statistics
correspond to those observed for the year 2000. Results are very similar to those presented in
Table 2. For instance, when φ1 decreases by a factor of 2, output per capita decreases by 55
48The calibrated parameter values are: α = 0.4, µ = 0.4509, β = 0.3747, γ = 0.123, D = 2.184, θ = 0.965,
kˆ0 = 0.0518, and φ1 = 0.557. Since barriers to female labour force participation decrease with capital accumulation,
then φ1900 = 0.5859 and φ2000 = 0.6325. In addition, we have that
y2000
y1900
= 7,
1−hw2000
1−hh2000
= 0.55,
φw2000h
w
2000
y2000
= 0.34.
Fertility in the calibrated economy is equal to 2.58 in 1900 and 2.03 in 2000. Therefore, the fall in fertility in this
model is more consistent with the fall observed in the data than with what is generated in the benchmark model.
In the data, fertility adjusted by survival to age 10 decreased from 2.6 in 1900 to about 2 in 2000. The real rate of
return is equal to 2.2 percent between 1975 and 2000 and the capital-to-output ratio is 5.8 in 2000.
49The difference equation for capital per unit of efficiency couple kˆt+1 = ξ˜(kˆt) will be similar to that of equation
(20), except that ∆(φ(kˆt)) will be a postive function of kˆt and h
w
t will decrease faster with respect to kˆt. There are
two effects on the speed of convergence. In the one hand, the speed of convergence increases because ∆(φ) is positively
related with φ and therefore with kˆt. In the other hand, h
w
t is decreasing in φ and this slows down convergence. In
our numerical exercises, the second effect dominates the first one.
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Figure 3: Model with endogenous gender barriers.
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(b) Hours worked versus capital per unit of efficiency
couple.
Notes: Black solid line: φ increases with kˆt; dotted black line: φ constant.
Table 4: Gender inequality and development: Quantitative properties of the model
Output per Female to Hours at Welfare Output per
capita, male home, % of capita,
% baseline earnings % baseline consumption % baseline
ratio (constant fertility)
U.S. (baseline) 100 63 100 0 100
φ = 1
1.5
× φbase 65 40 159 -6.17 83
φ = 1
2
× φbase 45 29 211 -11 68
φ = 1
3
× φbase 42 19 218 -14 65
percent, while in the baseline case it decreased by 50 percent. Notice, however, that now the
gender wage gap increases further, reflecting the additional assumption of endogenously decreasing
discrimination. The female to male earnings ratio decreases from 63 percent to 29 percent, while in
the baseline case it decreased to 32 percent. Therefore, to undertake a cross-country analysis, we
would need a smaller variation in φ than in our benchmark model. For instance, a decrease in φ1 so
that the female to male earnings ratio is the same as in the baseline case (say 30 percent), delivers
a decrease in output per capita that is roughly the same as when gender barriers were exogenous
(and φ constant). This implies that a counterfactual analysis similar to the one implemented in
Section 3.3 would yield similar results for this case when gender barriers depend on the level of
capital per effective unit of couple.
In Figure 4 we implemented an exercise similar to that produced in Figure 2. We changed φ1
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such that the model reproduces the gender wage gap observed in 2000 for the same 118 economies
considered in Figure 2. Firstly, notice the similarities of the two figures: In general, the model
predicts values of per capita output that are higher than those observed in the data; for some
countries, gender barriers explain most of the difference in relative output levels; and the model with
endogenous fertility shows a stronger positive correlation between predicted and actual values than
the exogenous fertility framework. The difference between these two correlations are statistically
different from zero at the usual confidence levels. The correlation between the predicted relative
income of the models presented in Figure 2(a) and 4(a) is 0.9981 when fertility is endogenous and
0.9972 when fertility is exogenous.50 For instance, for the case of Ireland in which the gender wage
gap in 2000 is 0.53, the output per capita will be 86 percent relative to the calibrated model. This
is very similar to the number found in Table 3, which for Ireland was 87 percent relative to baseline.
For the case of Egypt, output per capita will be 42.4 percent, which is roughly the same number
generated in Table 3.
Figure 4: Empirical data and model predictions: Endogenous gender wage gap
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Notes: Black squares represent model predictions with endogenous fertility and the black solid line is the best linear
fit. Gray circles and the accompanying gray solid line correspond to the constant fertility model. Dotted gray line:
45 degree line.
50For the exercise in which we consider economies with per capita income larger than 10% of the United States
level, then these correlations are 0.9978 and 0.9967, respectively.
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4. Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a model of economic growth where fertility and female labour market partici-
pation are endogenous as a way to estimate the output costs of gender discrimination. In our model,
gender discrimination drives a wedge between women’s labour productivity and female wages. We
calibrate the model economy so that the long-run equilibrium matches key statistics of the United
States economy, including the gender wage gap. We then compare this benchmark economy with a
counterfactual economy in which the value of all parameters are similar to those calibrated for the
United States economy, except for the gender wage gap. Gender discrimination decreases output
per capita in two ways: it discourages female labour market participation, thus decreasing output;
and it increases fertility and thus population in steady state, thus decreasing output per capita. The
two channels have similar quantitative relevance, with the decrease in labor market participation
coming out as slightly more important.
A counterfactual exercise using 118 developing and developed countries shows that for some
economies a large fraction of country differences in output per capita can be attributed to gender
inequality. For Saudi Arabia, gender discrimination explains all of its output difference relative to
the US. Were the U.S. to display the level of gender wage inequality present in, say, Egypt, its
output per capita could drop by 58 percent relative to the initial level. This estimate is obtained
by changing only the level of gender wage inequality in the U.S. benchmark economy so that it
matches Egypt’s value, while maintaining all other parameters as those calibrate for the United
States economy. Our conclusion is that many countries can make substantially better use of their
workforce and considerably increase output per capita by discouraging gender barriers in the labour
market. This is also valid for the United States. Output per capita would increase by 17 percent
if gender inequality were reduced to the level observed in, say, Sweden.
Further research should concentrate on two issues. The first is how distinct mechanisms of
gender discrimination - bias against participation versus wage discrimination - affect output. The
second, and most important, is the relationship between gender discrimination and the accumula-
tion of human capital. In particular, the discouragement of girls’s education might have a strong
impact on human capital and output per capita, as suggested in (cf., Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov,
and Santos, 2012).
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5. Model with gender productivity difference in the labour market
The model presented in Section 1 relies on the assumption that women and men differ as to their
productivity in raising children, while they are equally productive in the labor market. Another,
alternative possibility, is that there are two types of labour, physical and mental labor, as proposed
in Galor and Weil (1996). While each man is endowed with one unit of physical labour and one
unit of mental labour, each woman can offer one unit of mental labour only. As before, both men
and women can dispose of one unit of time, which they can divide between time at work and time
raising children.51 Though the child rasing technology and production function have changed, the
preferences of the couple are represented by the same utility function as before.
The production technology uses capital, mental labour, Lmt , and physical labour, L
p
t , to produce
output, according to a constant returns to scale production function:
Yt = K
α
t (AtL
m
t )
1−α +BAtL
p
t , (30)
where At = (1+µ)
t, B > 0, and α ∈ (0, 1). While physical labour is a substitute for physical capital,
mental labour is a complement to capital. Thus, physical labour loses importance as the economy
accumulates physical capital and its compensation deteriorates in relative terms. The wage of
51A previous version of this paper was based on this model, which is available at the CEPR working paper series
(see Cavalcanti and Tavares, 2007).
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physical labour, wpt , does not depend on capital accumulation, while the wage of mental labour,
wmt , increases with capital accumulation. Therefore, female labour force participation increases
as the relative wage of mental labour increases and, concomitantly, the gender wage gap,
φwmt
wpt+w
m
t
decreases.
Let ht be the time that parents devote to raising children. The child raising production function
is given by
nt = Dh
θ
t , D > 0, θ > 0, (31)
The opportunity cost of raising children is greater for a man, (wpt +w
m
t ), than for a woman, φw
m
t ,
φ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, if ht ≤ 1, only the wife will spend time raising children. In the case where
ht > 1 both men and women will raise children, but the man will also work some time in the market
In equilibrium, demand equals supply in all markets. In the market for mental labour this
means that Lmt = L
p
t (2−ht), or mt = L
m
t
Lpt
= 2−ht. Let kˆt be the capital level per unit of efficiency
couple, i.e., kˆt =
Kt
AtL
p
t
. We also have $t = (1 − φ)(1 − ht)wmt , such that transfers back to the
individual equal to the cost of discrimination. Then:
ht = min{1, γθ
(1 + β)φ+ γθ
[2 +
B
φ(1− α)kˆαt (2− ht)−α
]}. (32)
A necessary condition for women to participate in the labour market is still Assumption 1 and a
proposition similar to Proposition 1 hold in this model.
Proposition 4. Let assumption 1 be satisfied. Then female hours of work in the market increase
with capital accumulation, kˆt, and decrease with labour market discrimination (low φ).
Proof. Equation (32) determines ht as an implicit function of kˆt, ψ(kˆt, φ), and a critical value kˆ
∗(φ)
such that
ht =
 1 for kˆt ≤ kˆ
∗(φ),
ψ(kˆt, φ) for kˆt ≥ kˆ∗(φ),
(33)
and ψ(kˆt, φ) ∈ (0, 1] ∀ kˆt ≥ kˆ∗(φ), where:
kˆ∗(φ) = [
Bγθ
(1− α)(φ(1 + β)− γθ) ]
1
α . (34)
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Using the Implicit Function Theorem we can show that ψ1(kˆt, φ) < 0 and ψ2(kˆt, φ) < 0, as long as
kˆt ≥ kˆ∗(φ).
In equilibrium it can be shown that
kˆt+1 =

β[(1−α)kˆαt +B]
D(1+β)(1+µ)
for kˆt ≤ kˆ∗,
∆˜(φ)
[(1−α)kˆαt (2−ht)−α]θ [B+(1−α)kˆαt (2−ht)−α(2−(1−φ)ht)]
[B+2(1−α)kˆαt (2−ht)−α]θ
for kˆt ≥ kˆ∗,
(35)
where ∆˜(φ) = β[(1+β)φ+γθ]
θ
(1+β+γθ)(1+µ)D(γθ)θ
is a constant. Using (33) into (35) defines a non-linear difference
equation kˆt+1 = ξ(kˆt, φ). It is algebraically demanding to show that a stable locally steady-state
equilibrium exists. When φ = 1, the model is similar to Galor and Weil (1996) and we can always
guarantee the existence of such an equilibrium. For the calibrated parameters we always find
numerically that there is a locally unique steady-state equilibrium for any kˆ0 > kˆ
∗(φ).
Table 5, Part I, provides all parameter values as well as a note on how each one was obtained.
The calibration uses similar statistics to those used in the previous model. Now, we do not have to
calibrate parameter c¯, but we have to calibrate parameter B, which is related to the gender wage
gap. Then instead of targeting the fertility in 1900, we target the female to male wage earnings in
1900.52
We again explore how the equilibrium properties of the model change with gender barriers,
measured by the female to male earnings ratio. Table 6 shows that results are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar to those presented in Table 2. A decrease in φ by a factor of two decreases
output per capita by approximately 42 percent when fertility is endogenous, and 17 percent when
fertility is exogenous. Recall that a similar exercise using the model of Section 1 yielded 50 and
28 percent reductions in output per capita in the case of endogenous and exogenous fertility,
respectively (see Table 2). Notice that the effects on welfare are greater in this case than in
the model presented in Section 1. The reason is that parameter c¯ in the utility function of the
model presented in Section 1 is independent of the level of female labour force participation.
52Goldin (1990) shows that in 1900 the average employed female earned about 46 percent of the average employed
male across all occupations. In the manufacturing sector the female to male wage ratio was roughly 55 percent in
1900. As as result, we targeted a number for the female to male wage earnings in 1900 between 46 and 55 percent.
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Table 5: Parameter values and basic statistics
Part I: Parameter Values
Parameters Values Comment/Observations
α 0.4 Capital share based on Gollin (2002)
µ 0.4509 Rate of TFP growth based on
Greenwood at al (2005)
β 0.3747 Calibrated to match the T-Bill annual
real rate of return, 2.2%
γ 0.272 Constant population level along
the steady-state
D 2.2 Calibrated to match the average
private cost of children/GDP
θ 0.95 Calibrated to match hours worked
by women relative to hours worked
by men in 2000
B 0.025 Calibrated to match the U.S. female
to male earnings ratio in 1900
φ 0.725 Calibrated to match the U.S. female
to male earnings ratio in 2000
kˆ0 0.0505 Calibrated to match the U.S.
yUS2000/y
US
1900, (Maddison (2006))
Part II: Basic Statistics
U.S. economy Baseline economy
φwm1900/(w
p
1900 + w
m
1900) 46-55% 57%
φwm2000/(w
p
2000 + w
m
2000) 63% 62%
y2000/y1900 7.0 7.0
1− hw2000/1− hh2000 60% 56%
φwm2000h
w
2000/y2000 40% 35%
Table 6: Gender inequality and development: Quantitative properties of the model
Output per Female to Hours at Welfare Output per
capita, male home, % of capita,
% baseline earnings % baseline consumption % baseline
ratio (constant fertility)
Baseline 100 63 100 0 100
φ = 1
1.5
× φbase 74 41 138 -13.05 91
φ = 1
2
× φbase 58 30 169 -22.01 83
φ = 1
3
× φbase 40 19 218 -34.19 71
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6. Issues and Robustness
6.1. Measuring gender discrimination
Total wage inequality between men and women can be decomposed in two distinct parts: the first
stems from differences in gender attributes - education, skills, among others, and the second from
differences in the return to those attributes, including the effects due to gender discrimination.53
In this paper we use the raw differences in gender pay for several reasons:
(i) Measures of gender wage discrimination are not readily available for a sufficiently high and
diverse number of countries. An important source is Blau and Kahn (2003), who estimate
the “unexplained” gender wage gap for the United States and OECD countries only, a total
of 20 countries. Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) provide a quantitative review of
the vast empirical literature on the gender wage gap for a large sample of countries, but the
period examined changes markedly across countries, which limits their use for cross-country
comparisons as ours. In addition, most Middle-Eastern economies, generally characterized by
high levels of gender discrimination, are absent from the sample.
(ii) Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) unveil a strong positive correlation between the
gender wage gap and the unexplained residual, suggesting that the relative cost of discrimi-
nation across countries would remain substantially unaltered were we to use information on
the gender wage residual across countries.54
(iii) Much of the difference in endowments between women and men is explained by gender bar-
riers to the participation of women in the labour market (see Doepke and Tertilt, 2009). In
long-run models such as ours, where education and work experience are not explicitly con-
sidered, it makes sense to estimate the effects of discrimination by using raw gender wage
inequality rather than a measure of statistical discrimination since the incentives for females
53See Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973).
54Figure 2 of Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) plots the reported gender wage gap versus the reported
wage residual. For countries above the 450 line (e.g., Cote d’Ivoire, Tanzania, and Korea) women have lower en-
dowments than men. Part of the total wage gap, therefore, can be attributed to differences in human capital. In
countries below the 450 line (e.g., Singapore, Guinea, and Costa Rica) the contrary is true and women have higher
endowments than men, though still receiving less pay. The majority of countries, however, lies close to the 450 line.
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to obtain education and the experience they accumulate in the labour market are likely to
be, themselves, influenced by discrimination.
(iv) Finally, as reported by Blau and Kahn (2000) and Goldin (2006), there is a higher fraction
of women than men in low-paying jobs and at lower levels of the managerial hierarchy. This
can explain why returns on human capital characteristics, such as years of schooling and
experience, are different for men and women. But these gender occupational differences
might - are likely to - be driven also by discrimination.
The four reasons above suggest the use of a broad measure of discrimination rather than just
the gender wage residual. We also calculate the effects of gender barriers on development for the
estimates of the “unexplained” gender wage gap as provided by Blau and Kahn (2003). According
to their estimates, the “unexplained” gender wage gap in the United States is such that φ = 0.6804.
We recalibrate our parameters so that we matched the statistics reported in Table 1.55 Figure 5
reports output per capita relative to the United States, as generated by the model when the raw
rather than the “unexplained” wage gap is used.56 As we can observe, most of the points are very
close to the 45 degree line. This feature implies that the counterfactual income per capita levels
generated by the model using either the raw gender wage gap or the “unexplained” gender gap are
very similar for this sample of countries.
6.2. Selection bias in female labour force participation
There is evidence that gender wage inequality might be affected by gender-based selection bias.
Employed women tend to have relatively high levels of human capital and cognitive ability, a fact
which impacts the raw gender wage gap.57 Gender inequality in earnings would be even higher
than observed were this selection bias to be taken into account. On the other hand, since highly
productive women have a higher reservation wage than low skilled women, when gender barriers
are large, highly productive women are less likely to work. Concomitantly, the observed gender
55The calibrated value of the parameters are the same for α, µ, β, D, and θ. Then we set γ = 0.1315, such
that the population remains constant in the long run, and kˆ0 = 0.0509. Then, we have
y2000
y1900
= 7,
1−hw2000
1−hh2000
= 0.55,
φw2000h2000
y2000
= 0.35. The real rate of return is equal to 2.21 percent between 1975 and 2000 and the capital-to-output
ratio is 5.9 in 2000. Fertility is equal to 2.42 in 1900 and 2 in 2000.
56Blau and Kahn (2003) also report the raw gender wage gap used in the analysis. In this case, for the United
States we have that φ = 0.6737.
57As in Olivetti and Petrangolo (2008).
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Figure 5: Raw versus “unexplained” gender wage gap
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(a) Model with endogenous fertility
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(b) Model with exogenous fertility
Notes: Black squares represent model predictions with endogenous fertility. Gray circles represent model
predictions with constant fertility model. Dotted gray line: 45 degree line.
wage gap would be higher than if we were to correct for selection bias. Using United States
data, Mulligan and Rubinstein (2005) show that, in the 1980s and 1990s, working women typically
had better backgrounds than women not working, but women not working in the 1970s had better
backgrounds than women working. In sum, over time selection bias has changed signs, from negative
to positive.
How would sample selection in female labour force participation affect our counterfactual esti-
mates? In the case in which women not working have lower potential wages (lower productivity)
than women working, an increase in gender barriers to female labour participation (decrease in
φ) would decrease female labour participation, going from the left to the right of the productivity
distribution. In this case, our estimates in Section 3.3 overestimate the true effect of barriers to
female labour force participation on income levels since it is the low productivity women that are
abandoning the market first. However, notice that the change in φ to match the new female to
male earnings ratio would have to be higher, which suggests an underestimation of the true effect
of gender barriers on development. If instead women not working have better skills than those in
the labour market, the opposite is true. The overall quantitative implications of selection bias on
our results would therefore depend on the specific type of sample selection bias in each country and
the implied change in φ.
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Table 7: Empirical data and model predictions for reference economies. Source: United Nations (2005)
Countries Data Model
Output Female to Output Female to Output
per capita, male per capita, male per capita,
% of earnings % of earnings % of
baseline ratio baseline ratio baseline
(const fert)
Baselineφ1=0.557 100 63 100 63 100
Irelandφ1=0.4835 91 53 88 53 95
Greeceφ1=0.499 56 55 91 55 96
Singaporeφ1=0.467 71 51 86 51 94
Saudi Arabiaφ1=0.1525 37 16 45 16 68
Iranφ1=0.3904 19 39 66 39 84
Egyptφ1=0.219 10 23 45 23 68
Indiaφ1=0.2935 8 31 51 31 73
Though we recognize that selection bias is an important issue in the study of gender barriers
on economic development, it is unclear how it would change our results, qualitatively and quanti-
tatively.
6.3. Transition versus balanced growth path
In the simulations so far, we varied the level of gender barriers to female labour force participation
and calculated the effects of such barriers on output that would be observed in 2000. In such
simulations, we implicitly assume that different countries are at the same development stage as the
United States and that differences in the gender wage gap are due only to such gender barriers.
This might be the case of developed countries, which went through the transition to modern growth
at roughly the same time as the United States. It is unlikely to be true for developing countries.
Differences in the gender wage gap might then be explained by differences in stages of development,
as assumed in the subsection above. A similar point is made by Ngai (2004) and Parente and
Prescott (2005), who compare the effects of barriers to technology adoption on differences in country
incomes.
In Table 7 we change our gender barriers parameter in our U.S. calibrated economy of Subsection
3.4, such that we match the gender wage gap of a particular economy (e.g., Egypt) but, unlike our
previous exercises, we consider the particular economy in the year 1950, not 2000. This choice
of date implicitly suggests that the particular economy will take 50 years to reach its long-run
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equilibrium. We use the model with φ endogenous, but the benchmark model with φ constant
yields similar results. Compared to Table 3, gender barriers explain a similar but smaller fraction
of the difference in income levels between the U.S. and such selected economies. For countries with
large gender wage gaps (e.g., Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia), gender barriers remain a substantial
factor in explaining differences in output per capita. For instance, gender barriers now explain
61 percent of the difference in relative income level between Egypt and the U.S (compared to 68
percent if we consider differences using steady-state levels). In fact, gender barriers explain a large
fraction of the difference in income levels between Egypt and the U.S. even when we consider that
the Egyptian economy will take 100 years to reach the actual U.S. stage of development. In this
case, gender barriers alone still account for about 35 percent of the difference in output per capita
between the two countries. This is a sizeable impact of discrimination on income per capita, given
the parsimony of our model settings.
7. Gender inequality (φ) based on the gender gap index
In this Appendix we use the gender gap index (see Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi (2006)) to
estimate φ, instead of the female to male earnings ratio. This index is a composition of gender
discrimination indices in health, education, political and economic empowerment. To determine
the parameter estimate for φ for each country we multiplied the ratio of the gender gap index of
a country to the U.S. value by the baseline φ = 0.63. For instance, the gender gap index in the
United States and in Egypt are 70 and 58.1, respectively. The estimated value of φ for Egypt is
therefore φEgypt =
58.1
70 × φUS = 58.170 × 0.63=0.5229. Table 8 reports results using this approach.
Notice that variations in gender barriers are smaller than what we observe in Table 3. For instance,
in Table 3 we have that φEGY = 0.2736, while in Table 8 the same parameter for the gender barriers
in Egypt is φEGY = 0.5228. As a result, in almost all cases the female to male earnings ratios are
larger in the data than in model simulations presented in Table 8 and consequently the effects of
gender barriers on output are smaller than using the raw gender wage gap. Notice that there are
still important output losses. If gender barriers in the United States were similar to those observed
in Egypt, then output per capita would be 14 percent lower.
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Table 8: Empirical data and model predictions for reference economies. Source: United Nations (2005)
Countries Data Model
Output Female to Output Female to Output
per capita, male per capita, male per capita,
% of earnings % of earnings % of
baseline ratio baseline ratio baseline
(const fert)
BaselineφUS=0.725 100 63 100 63 100
Part (a)
IrelandφIRL=0.6713 91 53 105 67 102
GreeceφGRC=0.5984 56 55 96 60 98
SingaporeφSGP=0.5948 71 51 96 59 98
Saudi ArabiaφSAU=0.5085 37 16 84 51 93
IranφIRN=0.531 19 39 87 53 94
EgyptφEGY =0.5228 10 23 86 52 94
IndiaφIND=0.5346 8 31 88 53 95
Part (b)
FinlandφFIN=0.8327 77 71 110 72 104
NorwayφNOR=0.8348 99 77 110 73 104
SwedenφSWD=0.8441 77 81 111 73 104
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